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ARTICLES

Symposium on State Corporate AntiTakeover Legislation
Introduction
RANDALL

E. SCHUMANN*

The momentous events of the past year involving state takeoverrelated laws - judicial decisions as well as legislative activity in both
the state and congressional arenas - provide a timely and dramatic
stage for the articles in this symposium.
The symposium articles outline the various types of so-called
"second generation" state anti-takeover statutes and critique the
impact of judicial decisions on those statutes, as well as provide an
important overview of both the legislative choices and the legal issues
involved. The symposium articles also present a discussion of the
arguments for and against federal preemption of state takeover statutes, including their related policy underpinnings, economic and otherwise, and demonstrate how the battle lines on the preemption issue
are being drawn.
In this author's view, a major result of the United States Supreme
Court decision in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,' in April
1987, upholding the constitutionality of the Indiana Control Share
Acquisition Chapter, 2 has been the shifting of the "federal preemption
of state takeover statutes" debate from the judicial forum to the
congressional forum. This shift has occurred because of a critical
aspect of the CTS decision that has yet received little attention, but
which provides a valuable perspective from which to review and
* B.B.A., University of Wisconsin-Madison; J.D., University of Wisconsin.
Currently General Counsel, Wisconsin Commissioner of Securities Office; Chair,
North American Securities Administrators (NASAA) Tender Offer Regulation Committee; Co-Chair, NASAA/ABA Joint Committee on Model State Control Share Act.
1. 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
2. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42 (West Supp. 1988).
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consider the symposium articles. Namely, that the CTS Supreme Court
majority decision rejected the so-called "market for corporate control"
economic policy concept as a basis to invalidate state takeover statutes.
The Court did so by concluding that "[t]he Constitution does not
require the states to subscribe to any particular economic theory." 3
The Court later went on to state that "[w]e have rejected the 'notion
that the commerce Clause protects the particular structure or methods
of operation in a ...

market.'

",4

Following the 1982 Supreme Court

decision in Edgar v. MITE Corp.,' the "market for corporate control"
concept had been increasingly used in lower federal court decisions to
invalidate state takeover statutes. This was especially true, and was
particularly emphasized in the Seventh Circuit's decision in the CTS
a basis for the Court of Appeals
case which utilized such a policy as
6
Chapter.
Indiana
the
to invalidate
The majority decision of the Supreme Court in CTS thus has
determined that the federal judiciary may not invalidate a state takeover law based on one judge's view or one courts view of the "best"
economic policy for the nation and whether the particular state takeover
law in question conflicts with or frustrates such economic policy - in
the absence of an unequivocal congressional mandate regarding the
national policy on this issue. The CTS decision thereby implicitly
recognized that the "market for corporate control" is as yet only an
economic concept that is identified principally with economists from
the so-called "Chicago School"; an economic concept that has not yet
been recognized anywhere in express federal law or unambiguous
federal mandate (in the Williams Act or elsewhere) as a basis for
invalidating or preempting state takeover statutes. The Supreme Court
has repeatedly has stated its interpretation of the federal policy underpinnings and purposes of the Williams Act. Namely, that the federal

takeover regulatory scheme is intended to protect shareholders, while
3. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1649, 1652.
4. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1654, citing Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437
U.S. 117, 127 (1978).
5. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
6. Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 264 (7th Cir.
1986), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987) ("But whether or not an anti-takeover statute is
vulnerable to challenge under the commerce clause if it impedes mobility of corporate
assets, it is highly vulnerable if it impedes the important commerce in corporate
control. Even if a corporation's tangible assets are immovable, the efficiency with
which they are employed and the proportions in which the earnings they generate are
divided between management and shareholders depends on the market for corporate
control - an interstate, indeed international, market that the State of Indiana is not
authorized to opt out of, as in effect it has done in this statute.").
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neither favoring the bidder nor the target company in the process.'
The Supreme Court's decision in CTS thus puts both the debate
and the determination regarding whether there should be a national
policy to preempt state anti-takeover statutes squarely where most
persons would say it should be, before Congress. In this author's view,
the "bottom line" in this debate boils down to whether Congress will
"buy" the economic concept of the "market for corporate control"
as the basis for federal legislation preempting state anti-takeover
statutes.
In listing key factors which may impact on how Congress will act
on the preemption issue, the first point to be noted is that, like most
other areas of economic concept and theory, there has not developed
a consensus among economists as to whether takeovers, in general,
and hostile takeovers, in particular, are economically beneficial. Rather,
economists have conducted studies and issued papers that have reached
conclusions on opposite sides of the issue, as was pointed out in several
of the symposium articles. Perhaps the most telling conclusion on this
point was contained in the July 1983 Report of the Securities and
Exchange Commission's Advisory Committee on Tender Offers which
stated that "after considerable study, discussion and consideration of
comments and views, the Committee finds that there is insufficient
basis for concluding that takeovers are either per se beneficial or
detrimental to the economy or the securities markets in general, or to
issuers or their shareholders specifically.''8
A second aspect to be factored in the analytical equation of
whether and how Congress might act on the preemption issue is that
Congress acts on the basis of the collective vote of the individual
members of Congress; such that a majority of the members of each
house of Congress would have to vote to preempt the states in the
takeover area. Such a majority vote action by members of each house
of Congress may prove to be difficult inasmuch as virtually every state
can demonstrate the "bloody shirt" effects of the waves of hostile
takeovers ("bust-up" takeovers and otherwise) over the last several
years. These effects include closed plants, employee layoffs and other
economic or community negatives in various respects-all of which
have created substantial local constituencies in virtually every state
who have been adversely impacted by hostile takeovers. Those con-

7. CTS, 107 S.Ct. at 1644; Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S.
1, 8-9 (1985); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 29 (1977).
8. Executive Summary, Securities and Exchange Commission Advisory Committee on Tender Offers, Report of Recommendations, p. xvii (July 15, 1983).
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stituencies are major factors in the voting process when members of
Congress from those affected jurisdictions face reelection. It is to be
noted that in the prior session of Congress there were reported to be
some 3-score separate pieces of federal legislation introduced by Senators and Representatives that would restrict takeovers in various
respects. Such is an indication of what federal legislation preempting
the states would have to overcome in terms of congressional sentiment
regarding takeovers.
Another factor confronting Congress in the preemption analysis
is the evidence that the existence of the various types of "second
generation" takeover statutes-29 states currently have one or more
such statutes, with 12 states having enacted statutes since the April
1987 CTS decision-has not deterred hostile takeovers. This is evidenced by the fact that on just one day, February 29, 1988, no less
than 6 hostile takeovers involving in excess of $5.4 billion were
commenced. 9 Further, numerous recent examples exist' 0 of hostile
offers succeeding in the face of even the "New York-type" version of
the "business combination freeze" statutes, considered by authors of
symposium articles to be the most potent of the'state takeover statutes
in terms of deterring hostile offers. The principal consequences from
operation of the state takeover laws in those situations were that target
company shareholders received a higher price for their shares and/or
that target company management extracted an agreement from the
bidder to retain local headquarter operations in the state and limiting
plant closings. These results can hardly be deemed "negative," whether
from a shareholder or community standpoint, or from a microeconomic or macroeconomic standpoint. The only remaining economic
argument against state takeover statutes-the acknowledged fact that
such state laws may result in deterring some hostile offers from being
commenced (principally "low ball" offers seeking to acquire a target
company at a relatively inexpensive price before competing bids can
develop)-does not appear to be a compelling basis for Congress to
preempt state takeover regulation. After all, nowhere is it written that
the first takeover bidder should "win", just as nowhere is it written,
under corporate merger and acquisition law, that the first party to
propose a merger should "win".
All of the above factors as well as others not discussed in this
Introduction will be considered by Congress as part of the legislative
9. Wall St. J., Mar. 1, 1988, § 1, at 3, col. 1.
10. Amber Acquisition Corp. (Bond Corporations Holdings Ltd.)/Heileman
Brewing Co.; Bilzerian Partners, Ltd./The Singer Corporation; Salant Acquisition
Corp./Manhattan Industries Inc.
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process dealing with the preemption issue. If the result is that Congress
refuses to accept the "market for corporate control" concept as a
basis for federal preemption of state takeover laws, the judicial battles
over the various types of second generation state laws analyzed in
certain of the symposium articles can be expected to continue. In
addition, more legislative experimentation with state takeover regulation in the state "laboratories" will take place-both in terms of
developing different types of legislative approaches as well as considering more refined versions of existing statutory approaches such as
the Model Control Share Acquisition Act recently developed by an
ABA/NASAA Joint Committee that I was privileged to Co-chair and
be a part of."
The national debate regarding the proper scope of state involvement and impact on takeovers can be expected to continue. The articles
in this symposium provide an important sharpening of the focus of
that debate.

11. MODEL CONTROL SHARE ACT (Final Draft, Mar. 29, 1988) (ABA/NASAA

Joint Committee).

